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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the West, historical treatments of the rise of the factory system 
have always stressed the attitudes, pressures, and discontents of the 
workers. Despite this historical interest most economic analysis of early 
European and American industrialization has stressed changes not in the 
supply but in the demand for labor, particularly technological develop- 
ments, capital accumulation, and the opening of markets. Not surprisingly, 
the few systematic international historical comparisons of labor supply 
which have been made have come up with widely diverse conclusions. 
Morris (1960) concludes explicitly that labor supply was a “slack variable” 
and extends this assertion not only to India (1855-1914) but to Great 
Britain (1770- 1830) and remarkably to New England (1792- 1840): “In no 
case did the shortage of skilled labor . . . inhibit the pace at which 
the industry would otherwise have expanded . . . I think it is safe to say 
that the supply of raw unskilled labor was never an inhibiting factor in 
economic growth.” In contrast Gerschenkron (1%2) has made the 
inelasticity of the supply of such labor in the early stages of develop- 
ment, regardless of national demographics, a foundation block in his 
understanding of the industrial development of the various continental 
European countries. Lacking the traits of stability, reliability, and dis- 
cipline, it is argued the underemployed peasants and urban poor of 
nineteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe did not necessarily 
translate into a ready supply of labor for the newly borrowed 
Western European factory system. 
For Japan, quite unlike the experience of Europe and the United 
States, historical economists and economic historians have not neglected 
the description and economic analysis of the supply of labor in early 
industrialization. Drawing on an already venerable Marxist tradition in 
the 1920s and 193Os, academic members of the two Marxist factions, the 
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Koza-hu and the Rdnb-ha, developed proto-two-sector models of Japa- 
nese economic development which among other contributions analyzed 
how changes in agricultural conditions might affect the terms of labor 
supply to the industrial sector.’ In the postwar period, Ohkawa 
(1955), seemingly building on some insights by Koza-ha writers, de- 
veloped a highly influential model which rationalized the coexistence of 
Japanese unemployment with equilibrium conditions by assuming average 
productivity pricing of labor in agriculture and marginal productivity 
pricing in industrial employment. Supply of labor to industry was 
governed by the average productivity of labor in agriculture while 
demand was governed by industry’s marginal productivity of labor curve.2 
Ohkawa’s theoretical apparatus has shaped the writing of modern 
Japanese economic history. In both Ohkawa’s Japanese language writing 
on Japan’s economic evolution and his English language collaboration 
with Rosovsky (1973) its influence is almost transparent. The creation and 
growth of a modem industrial sector in the midst of a traditional 
agricultural economy fed by elastic supplies of labor and the final de- 
struction of the traditional sector are themes which dominate Ohkawa’s 
empirical work. 
Ohkawa’s view that Japan’s industrial sector fed on elastic supplies of 
labor from the traditional sector [a view compatible with Morris (1960)] 
is explicitly contrasted with Gershenkron’s historical finding that for 
continental Europe underemployment of labor is not synonymous with 
elastic supplies of labor to a nascent industrial sector in Rosovsky’s 
Capital Formation in Japan. Rosovsky finds that Japan, unlike Germany 
and Russia, could quickly make a disciplined and reliable labor force 
out of its underemployed population. 
There is both direct and indirect evidence that Japan was capable of forming 
a disciplined and reliable labor force, suitable for factory work, more easily than 
many backward countries of continental Europe. The histori’cal record such as it is, 
contains few complaints on this score. Population growth spewed forth labor 
1 Among other considerations these Marxist schools differed as to the mode of factor 
pricing in Japan’s agricultural sector. The Koza-ha stressed the continuing importance of 
feudal institutions in Japanese economic life and argued for nonmarket forces determining 
rents and wages in the agricultural sector. On the other side, the R&to-ha saw Japan as a 
through-going bourgeois society since at least the late Tokugawa period. Wages and rents 
were seen as nonfeudal being determined by essentially neoclassical markets. A simpli- 
fied exposition of some of this work is given in Yasuba (1968, 1972- 1973) and Saxonhouse 
(1976a). 
2 Ohkawa’s (1955) model has had wide influence in the West. With Lewis (1954), Ohkawa 
can claim to have had influence on the not fully neoclassical and very well-known de- 
velopment theories of Jorgenson (l%l) and Fei and Ranis (1964). Jorgenson like Ohkawa 
assumes average producitivity pricing of labor in agriculture and marginal productivity pric- 
ing of labor in industry. Fei and Ranis follow Lewis and assume an exogenously determined 
subsistence wage rate in agriculture but otherwise, use a two-sector analytical framework 
which draws heavily on Ohkawa’s thinking. 
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from the countryside, creating competition for industrial jobs; and even though it 
took a long time to cut the cord reaching to the rural areas, after a while the cord 
became stretched beyond recognition. 
Rosovsky (1961, p. 123) explains Japan’s success in this area by noting 
the survival of traditional institutions into the early factory system. 
Sociologists tell us that Japanese society is very “integrated” and therefore 
may present lesser disciplinary problems. Others have emphasized innovating 
enterprising leadership, combined with teamwork and solidarity in group organ- 
ization, “sufficient” to give order and momentum to the process of change 
contemplating factory employment, or more specifically servicing a machine, 
probably filled the early Japanese worker with a certain amount of horror. But 
the transition was made softer and smoother by the concessions which the 
factory was willing to make to him: he was still treated as a typical Japanese. . 
Japanese economic development has taken place with much less change from 
the kinds of social organization and social relations of pre-industrial or non- 
industrial Japan than would be expected from the Western model of the growth 
of industrial society. 
Rosovsky’s writing on Japan’s labor force in early industrialization 
remains an extreme statement of the view that (i) Japan had relatively 
elastic supplies of labor suitable for factory work; and (ii) the ease with 
which early Japanese industry obtained such labor may be attributed to 
culturally distinctive circumstances .3 Subsequent Western writers have 
emphasized the important Japanese scholarship and primary evidence 
which Rosovsky overlooked in drawing his conc1usions.4 Indeed the 
pendulum has swung far in the other direction with Saxonhouse 
(1976b) now finding that the early Japanese factory textile labor force was 
more unstable and undisciplined than their historical counterparts else- 
where in Asia, in the Northern and Southern United States, and in 
a In making his assessment of early Japanese labor markets Rosovsky (1961) grafted the 
idealized picture of the postwar Japanese factory drawn by the sociologist turned manage- 
ment consultant Abegglen (1958) into a Meiji era setting. 
4 In the West, Taira (1970) was among the earliest to use both Japanese scholarship and 
primary evidence to criticize the observation that the Meiji Japanese economy had under- 
employment in its traditional sector and/or that the Meiji industrial worker was well dis- 
ciplined by comparison with the experience of other nascent modem labor forces. Among 
the important Japanese scholarship on prewar labor supply the writings of Kazuo Okochi 
and his students, Keizo Fujibayashi, and the R&r&ha leader Takao Tsuchiya should not 
be neglected. In Rdd6 mondai and in many other writings, Okochi analyzes the role of the 
dekasegi-gata-the industrial worker who has not cut his ties to the traditional sector. 
Fujibayashi (1960) was perhaps the first Japanese postwar economic historian to call partic- 
ular attention to the high turnover rates of the mid-Meiji era. Finally, Takeo Tsuchiya, an 
extremely prolific and distinguished Japanese economic historian who has written on many 
tofiics, is noteworthy in this context among other efforts in having the Me&-era govem- 
ment report Shokkd jg6 reissued in 1948. The Shokkb jijr, contains an excellent quantitative 
description of working conditions in early Japanese factories. When its three volumes were 
originally published in 1903 it had an impact comparable to the famous Sadler’s Committee 
Report (1831-1832). 
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continental Europe.5 Moreover, this finding is not rooted in an analysis 
which emphasizes the culturally inherent difficulties of using Japanese 
men and women on a long-term basis for textile factory work.s Rather, 
Japan’s early industrialists found the kind of labor force they wanted. This 
is not a case of a series of unsuccessful attempts to do what could not 
be done. The industry’s offerings and the labor force’s preferences and 
alternative opportunities and needs were simply never reconciled to strike 
the bargain which would create a stable, permanent labor force. Gerschen- 
kron (1962) argued that underemployed labor notwithstanding, the 
absence of the traits of reliability, stability, and discipline in workers re- 
cently emerged from peasant society would force newly developing 
economies to adopt large-scale, capital intensive modes of production. A 
view more in accord with the Japanese experience would find the 
quality of the early industrial labor force to be as much a decision variable 
and market outcome as scale and factor proportions. 
II. THE SUPPLY OF QUALITY WORKERS AND THE 
DEMAND FOR QUALITY IN JOBS 
How did the market process fix the quality of labor? Most Japanese 
workers chose not to remain in the cotton textile industry because with 
only a few exceptions long-term opportunities for higher than agricultural 
wages in this industry came only at a cost. Good opportunities required 
experience and without mill-owner subsidies more experience meant 
lengthier periods in the mill receiving less than agricultural wages. Mill 
owners were most reluctant to finance this implicit cost for the worker. 
The unusual degree of technological homogeneity among Japanese textile 
firms made interfirm mobility of experienced workers potentially very 
easy. Thus, investment in the work force by the mill owner could not be 
easily recouped. Textile workers for their part were typically in no posi- 
tion to make such an investment. With opportunities thus constricted 
low wages and high turnover persisted for decades as the industry norm.’ 
5 In Saxonhouse (1976b) instability is indexed primarily by turnover experience. Similar 
conclusions, however, can be drawn from examination of the rate of absenteeism. In 
1913 (Uno, 1913) as in 1897 (Dai nihon bbseki rengdkai) the rate of absenteeism of workers 
living in company-owned dormitories was 8.5%. While these rates may seem low by com- 
parison with figures cited for other countries the contrary is true. Estimates collected for 
other textile industries (Morris, 1960) typically compare workers showing up against a 
hypothetical full stafling. When Japanese figures are put on the same basis the absentee rate 
jumps to at least 15%. 
6 Before management discussion of modem Japanese labor relations became firmly rooted 
in Confucian rhetoric such analyses were not uncommon. Fukuhara (1903) suggests that 
Japanese textile workers, unlike Americans, are too rooted to their native places to ever 
become members of a permanent, stable industrial work force. Similarly, Kamisaka (1919) 
argues that Japanese textile workers are uniquely insensitive to pecuniary incentives. 
r The analysis here is presented in full detail in Saxonhouse (1976b). 
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This discussion of the transience and instability of the Japanese textile 
industry labor force ignores the paternalistic practices emphasized by 
Rosovsky in his account of the Meiji labor force. Over a long term, 
instability and indiscipline make strange bedfellows with paternalism. Yet 
this apparently was the case for at least 50 years in Japan.* How do 
the paternalistic practices of the Japanese mill owners fit into the picture 
drawn here of a labor force whose indiscipline and instability was the 
accepted outcome of industry policies? It is easy to suggest that pa- 
ternalism was a sham adopted from approved Confucian writing to mask 
the use of very young workers in what were by Japanese and Western 
standards very mean circumstances. But this is probably too simple. 
Japanese cotton spinning mills did have all the accoutrements of pa- 
ternalism. There was the mill dormitory and dining hall, the mill health 
personnel and dispensary and/or hospital, the mill school with teacher 
and classrooms, as well as the other side of paternalism, the often- 
severe restrictions on what mill workers might do during their nonworking 
hours. What were the Japanese mill managers trying to accomplish with 
this panoply of ameliorative institutions? How did these nonpecuniary 
characteristics of jobs affect labor supply and job choice? In early in- 
dustrialization, what did Japan’s workers value? And how did their tastes 
vary across different kinds of workers? What were the characteristics of 
workers attracted by paternalistic institutions? 
In what follows, the Japanese cotton spinning mill will be viewed as 
supplying a bundle of job characteristics relating to wages, pace of work, 
hazards and health care, and the availability and quality of dormitory life. 
Workers will be viewed as having preferences with respect to varying 
8 Hazama (1964) and Taira (1970) have argued that the commonly understood paternalistic 
practices of Japanese employers were successful profit-maximizing attempts to curb 
the extreme instability and unreliability of the early Japanese worker. In Saxonhouse 
(1976b) the success of these practices is questioned. Much of both Hazama’s and Taira’s 
work is based on the experience of the cotton textile industry and, in particular, the 
experience of the Kanegafuchi Spinning Co. (hereafter Kanebb). From the late 1890s onward 
Kanebb was the recognized leader in evolving paternalistic practices toward the labor force. 
Likewise its long-time president Sanji Muto was the preeminent ideologue for this pattern 
of employer-employee relations. Examination of the regular-confidential report on the de- 
parture of entering monthly cohorts of recruits prepared by Mutb for internal dissemination 
within Kanebo indicates that even 20 years after Mutb introduced his celebrated changes 
in Kanebo’s Hyogo mill worker instability had hardly declined and was still extremely high 
by international standards. Cross-sectionally Kanebd’s experience seems no different from 
other mills in the Japanese cotton spinning industry. Regardless of paternalistic practices 
or the lack thereof, other mills’ turnover experiences hardly differed from that of Kanebo. 
Moreover, if the pattern of departure which is inferred from the Kanebo data is applied to 
more general spinning industry recruitment data the mean experience of the industry worker 
can be accurately tracked right through 1935. This suggests that the pattern of instability 
which Fujibayashi (1960) and others have identified for mid-Meiji persisted from the days of 
Sanji Muto’s managing directorship past the implementation of Japan’s Factory Law in 1929 
up until the Pacific War. 
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bundles of job characteristics. Such preferences will be assumed varying 
with the traits of these workers. Age, experience, education, and other 
presumptively valuable traits will be viewed as shaping the preferences of 
workers.g The markets for job characteristics in early industrialization 
which result from the interaction of firm desires and capabilities with 
workers’ preferences and opportunities have never been studied sys- 
tematically for any period of any country’s economic history. The re- 
search reported here for mid-Me@ Japan is intended as a first effort in an 
important neglected area of inquiry.‘O 
III. THE DATA 
The early development of the Japanese industry presents an unusual 
opportunity for conducting an investigation into worker preferences and 
worker quality. In 1897 as discussions in Noshomusho (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce) caused heightened concern among cotton 
spinning firms that strict factory legislation might be enacted Dai nippon 
boseki rengokai (All Japan Cotton Spinners Association; hereafter, 
Boren) established a working group of the representatives of 14 firms, 
Shokko jijo chosa i-in (Investigation Committee on Factory Labor), for 
the purpose of collecting information on the working conditions in the 
industry.” In an industry whose constituent firms had been reporting to 
B&en for more than 8 years a remarkably detailed account of their output, 
input, and costs, it is perhaps not surprising that this committee was 
exceedingly successful in meeting its charge.12 Seventy-one thousand 
workers in 75 mills were examined. A common unusually quantita- 
tively detailed report in identical format was obtained from each mill: (i) on 
recruitment practices and payments; (ii) on workers classified by age, work 
experience, and literacy; (iii) on number and length of rest periods during 
a working day and on length of shifts and number of days between shift 
rotation; (iv) on wage payment systems; (v) on expenditure on health 
care, number of doctors and nurses in attendance, incidence of sickness, 
injury, and death attributable to particular diseases and other causes; 
(vi) on prevalence of dormitories and their rules and restrictions, on 
food costs, and on supervisory and educational personnel costs; and 
(vii) on the rate of worker absenteeism and on the time pattern of 
permanent separation from the mi11.13 
9 Elsewhere in Saxonhouse (1977) it has been established that increasing education and 
experience were major determinants of productivity change in this industry. 
lo Viewing commodities as bundles of attributes and discussing markets for such com- 
modities in terms of markets for their attributes has been common for some time among 
economists. See Lancaster (1966), Rosen (1974), and Lucas (1975). 
‘I The formation of the committee is discussed in hi nihon bdseki rengdkai hdkoku (1897). 
I2 Some description of the production data reported is given in Saxonhouse (1977). 
I3 While the subject being probed is most sensitive the reliability of the data seems 
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The summary of this investigation paints an interesting picture of mill 
life in the late 1890s. A significant percentage of the total industry labor 
force was recruited hundreds of miles from where the spinning mills were 
located. Already in the 1890s the familiar pattern of Kansai (Osaka, 
Kobe, and Kyoto) mills recruiting girls from Southern Kytishti and 
Shikoku, and Kantd (Tokyo area) mills recruiting girls from northern 
Honshu had become established.14 On recruitment the worker’s family 
received a bonus which on the average was equivalent to approximately 
20-days’ beginning wages. The typical recruitee was a teen-aged girl. For 
the spinning mill female labor force as a whole the average age was 19 
years, with almost 30% of the labor force aged 14 years or less. 
The young girls who were recruited faced a working day which on the 
average was almost 12 hr long, with an average of somewhat more than 
three rest periods interspersed throughout the day. In aggregate these rest 
periods come to about 1 hr for each shift. Half the mill labor force worked 
a day shift typically beginning at 6 AM, and half worked an evening shift 
beginning at 6 PM. On the average shifts rotated after an 8-day interval. 
A large majority of the female workers did live in company-run dormi- 
tories. These dormitories, to some extent, inspired by glowing reports of 
the early nineteenth-century Lowell, Massachusetts, experience, offered 
the workers many services and placed many restrictions on the workers’ 
off-the-job activities. l5 Permission to leave the mill compound was 
restricted. Mill regulations varied: Some mills allowing 1 or 2 hr outside 
the mill each day, others allowing none. In practice, these regulations 
were more of a mill ideal than a practice. Infractions of mill discipline, 
a less than excellent attendance record, and an otherwise poor work record 
led to a suspension of the privilege. 
Included among the benefits offered workers by mills were sub- 
sidized food in company dormitories and health and educational facilities. 
The implicit food subsidy per month was on average equivalent to a 
week’s wage for an inexperienced female recruit. Also, 63 of the 65 mills 
reporting on their provision of health care had dispensaries staffed by at 
least one full-time nurse, while 37 of the mills surveyed offered general 
educational instruction to its workers. 
Having dispensaries in the mills certainly made sense since at one 
excellent. For example, the Kanegafuchi Spinning Mill’s (hereafter Kanebo) internal docu- 
ments are virtually identical with what was reported to the Shokkd jijo chosa i-in. Some 
discussion of the Kanebo documents is contained in Saxonhouse (1976b). 
I4 After 1924, the exact regional distribution of spinning industry recruits is available in 
Kbseisho. The distribution in 1924 was quite similar to the regional distribution reported in 
1897. And the regional distributions in 1897 and 1924 or as late as 1952 resemble the 
pattern reported by Nihon bbseki kyokai (the successor association to B&en). 
I5 On the role of foreign models in the development of the spinning industry’s dormitory 
system see Saxonhouse (1974). 
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time or another during the course of the year at each mill an average 
of 75% of the labor force would become ill. And, while it is difficult to 
ascertain the quality of health care, the survival rate of mill workers 
from sickness and accident was excellent. The mills surveyed experienced 
no more than 4.3 deaths per 1000 workers during 1897. Given the age 
distribution of workers in the mills surveyed mill workers experienced a 
lower mortality rate than the average of the age cohorts from which 
they were drawn.ls 
Again it is difficult to ascertain the quality of primary education of- 
fered. It should be noted that among the 37 mills offering primary edu- 
cation instruction there was on the average but four instructors for each 
1000 female workers. Since 30% of the work force was 14 years of age or 
under, individual exposure was probably quite limited. This is not surpris- 
ing. The typically 2-hr-long classes were scheduled at 7 PM for the day 
shift and 7 AM for the night shift. The attentiveness of workers coming 
off the ll-hr working day with only an hour’s mealtime in between can 
only be surmised! 
The high worker turnover which was characteristic of the cotton spin- 
ning labor force during the entire pre-Pacific War period was certainly 
indicated in this survey in 1897. Over 40% of the newly recruited 
workers left the mills within the first 6 months of their initial employ- 
ment.” The average work experience of the spinning industry labor force 
in 1897 was no more than 1.5 years. Temporary absences from the 
work place were also high. The rate of absenteeism among dormitory 
workers during the survey month was 8.3%.‘* 
I6 This result should be qualified. Mortality rate for mill workers has been compared 
with mortality rates constructed using the Meiji life tables constructed by Mot-ha (1944) and 
Yasukawa (1971). That the mortality rate in the factories were lower than outside them does 
not mean that country girls reduced their risk of death by entering mill work. Sickly girls 
simply did not enter the mills. Workers who became ill might leave the mill, subsequently 
dying at home from a mill-contracted disease or injury. For a later period reports of this 
happening are legion. Also note that the mortality rate reported for 1897 is lower than the 
mortality rates for cotton spinning workers reported in 1907 and 1910. The 1907 rate is 5.4 
deaths per 1000 workers; the 1910 rate is 12.6 deaths per 1000 workers. These mortality 
rates are reported in Noshomushb (1910) and Ishihara (1913). 
I’ This rate of departure is rather lower than what was characteristic of the industry 
for much of the pre-Pacific War period. This is true at both the individual mill as well as 
at the aggregate industry level. As footnote 16 indicates the same phenomenon is found in 
the mortality statistics. See also footnote 5. 
** The conditions, good and bad, uncovered by the BBren investigators were soon diffused 
to Japan’s political and &onomic elites. The celebrated Noshomushb report Shokkd j&j 
(Condition of Factory Workers) which appeared 5 years later was clearly influenced by 
Bbren’s early work. A large proportion of the materials on textiles in this famous report 
were directly taken from the 1897 survey. The results of the survey also soon surfaced in 
Western languages. The very same year Bdseki shokkb jija chdsa gaiyo appeared, La 
protection ouvrihe au Japan drawing very heavily on the B&en survey was published in 
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Internationally speaking, the conditions described in the Boren report 
have a patina of familiarity. The dormitories and deportment classes for 
female workers call to mind Lowell, Massachusetts. The high rates of 
worker turnover are reminiscent of the Southern Piedmont, and the age 
of the workers and the accidents described resemble, at least anecdotally, 
the findings of British parliamentry commissions in the early nineteenth 
century. What is different in the Japanese case is the auspices and 
quality of the report on working conditions. The cotton textile industry 
itself undertook a comprehensive survey. Of all the internationally familiar 
circumstances in the early history of the Japanese cotton labor force it is 
only for the Japanese case that such a massive almost universal survey 
on so many pertinent dimensions was undertaken so early in the industry 
history. Analysis of this unique body of data should bear not only on the 
interpretation of the Japanese experience but should more generally in- 
form us of the process of early industrialization. 
IV. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS 
OF JOB AND WORKER ATTRIBUTES 
The traditional theoretical treatment of job choice which dates back as 
far as Adam Smith has stressed wage differentials as compensating for 
differences in job attributes. Similarly, the historical treatment of job 
choice in early industrialization has highlighted the importance of working 
conditions and living environments in addition to wages in the decision to 
accept and continue factory work. For all the theoretical insight and 
historical suggestion, there has been virtually no systematic econometric 
analysis of the market for job characteristics, whether done on con- 
temporary or traditional data. In part the lack of appropriate data has 
been responsible. In part there has also been the presumption that the 
forces producing observed wage variation are so varied and so complex 
as to preclude isolating the impact of individual effect: however, such 
presumption may fly in the face of a profession with a now long history 
of performing multiple-regression analysis. It is not clear why price deter- 
mination in labor markets should be more complex than in any other 
market where tied sales occur. Indeed, the hedonic reconstruction of 
demand theory suggests that tied sales and package deals of product char- 
acteristics are the rule and not the exception in virtually all market 
exchange.lg With this in mind and given the availability of a rich data set 
it is appropriate to proceed with this almost unprecedented investigation 
of workers’ preferences with respect to place of employment. 
French. The author was the N&.homushb official Kashiro Saito. The Saito book was later 
summarized and reviewed in the Economic Journal by Foxwell (1901). 
Is For other applications of the hedonic approach to labor markets see Smith (1976) and 
Thaler (1974). Both these applications treat only one job characteristic. See also footnote 10. 
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The market which is being investigated is hypothesized to consist of 
firms on the one side that in the context of profit maximization were 
seeking workers of varying quality and were offering wages and the op- 
portunity to live and work in a mill compound offering many amenities 
and disamenities. On the other side, workers of varying traits in the 
course of attempting to maximize utility were seeking high wages and 
good working conditions and living environments. It is further assumed 
that firm decisions on the quality mix of workers hired and the mix of 
amenities and disamenities offered were separable from other firm de- 
cisions. Similarly, it is assumed that worker decisions regarding the mix 
among wages and other amenities were separable from other consump- 
tion decisions. 
Ignoring random terms the model to be estimated can be written as 
Wi(Z) = P(W,, W,, 21, . . . , ZN, T,, . . . , TK) i = 1, . . . , N 
= demand for job characteristics, 
(1) 
W,(Z) = GYWc, Z,, . . . , Z.v, T,, . . . , Ttc, M,, . . . , MM) 
= supply of job characteristics, 
i=l 7 - * * 9 N (2) 
where Wi(Z) is the price of the job characteristic Zi; WC is money wages 
available for off-the-job consumption; W, is money fees available for off- 
the-job consumption; Tj is thejth worker attribute; Mk is the k th nonjob 
firm characteristic. The Ws, Zs, and Ts in the system of demand and 
supply Eqs. (1) and (2) are assumed to be endogenous. The MS are assumed 
to be predetermined. Thus, if M > K + N + 1, the demand equations will 
be identified. 
While data on Zt, W,, Wf, T,, and M are potentially available, the 
absence of explicit markets for individual job characteristics as opposed 
to jobs or bundles of job characteristics mean that the Wi would not 
normally be available. It has been widely suggested that the WI might be 
computed from the derivative of the wage explaining regression. Let 
wages be explained by 
Wc = H(Z,, . . . , ZN, T,, . . . , TK), 
with (aW,(Z))/(aZJ = p,(Z). 
(3) 
It should be emphasized that estimation of Eq. (3) alone without fol- 
lowing through with the estimation of the system of supply and demand 
equations will not give us the information being sought here. w,(Z) may 
be thought of as a function which traces out the transactions generated 
by the intersection of buyers of Z,‘s compensated demand functions and 
sellers of Zi’S compensated supply functions. In the markets for job char- 
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acteristics being studied here workers clearly differ according to their traits 
and qualities and firms clearly differ according to their cost conditions if 
for no other reason than factor prices differed regionally in Japan. Thus, 
WIi(Z) is generated by many different demand functions intersecting with 
many different supply functions. W{(Z) will be determined by the distribu- 
tion of buyers and sellers in the 1897 samples. The slope of WJi(Z) in 
Wi, Zi space is not the slope of a demand curve nor the slope of a 
supply curve. If we wish to understand the determinants of the trans- 
action prices for each of the job characteristics rather than “simply” the 
implicit transaction price itself demand and supply functions must be identi- 
fied and estimated.20 
V. THE ESTIMATION OF THE IMPLICIT PRICES 
OF JOB CHARACTERISTICS 
In the estimation which follows it will be assumed that Eq. (3) is 
semilogarithmic. 
In W,f = C aJi + 1 bjTj + C ~k,Rk + Wo, 
where Wef = female wage rate; Z, = bonus paid to recruitee; Z, = length 
of working shift; Z, = length of rest periods during shift; Z, = incidence of 
sickness and injury at firm; Z, = mortality at firm; Z6 = living in 
dormitory; Z, = if dormitory is occupant, number of free hours per day; 
Z, = food subsidy for dormitory worker; Zg = company primary and de- 
partment school instructional personnel per worker; T, = risk of recruit 
leaving within 6 months; T2 = age of worker; T, = relevant experience of 
worker; T4 = rate of absenteeism; T, = literacy of worker; R, = agri- 
cultural wage rate in area in which plant is located; W. = constant term. 
The results of estimating the wage explaining relationship are presented 
in Table 1. By the standards of semilogarithmic regressions of wage on 
explanatory variables, the results in Table 1 are most interesting. For 
a one-tailed test of significance with a .OS critical region, five explanatory 
variables and the constant term are significant with the expected sign. 
When the critical region is expanded to 10% another six explanatory 
variables become significant. 
2o Even if labor were perfectly mobile tii should differ from mill to mill provided the func- 
tional form of (3) is nonlinear. This is an issue which may be resolved empirically, but 
that a nonlinear form for (3) might be hypothesized at all requires some discussion. First, 
it must be assumed that workers cannot repackage jobs. In the present context this is quite 
easy to assume. Part-time work was really not feasible at all for mill girls. Also all re- 
numerative work was done within the set mill environment. I f  mill workers slept in the 
dormitories and if their access to the world outside was limited they could hardly fail to use 
company dining halls or company health facilities. Second, it is also assumed that firm tech- 
nology for designing or producing jobs is not linear. This is a common but, of course, not 
universally made assumption for production functions. For further discussion of these issues 
see Rosen (1974) and Lucas (1975). 
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a Significant at 1% level. 
b Significant at 10% level. 
c Significant at 5% level. 
.763 x IO" 
-.350 x lo-‘* 
.362 x IO-'* 
-.438 x 10-1c 
-.289 x 1O-2 
.259 x l f f  
-.19oc 
-.403 x 10-36 
-.149 x lo-‘c 
-.133 x 102c 
.348 x 10-4 
.303 x lo-'* 
.166 x 10-l” 
-.179 x lo-*’ 
-.385 x 10-l 
.694 x 10-3” 
R= = .93 
A. Agricultural Opportunities and Bonii 
In examining each of the explanatory variables seriatum it will first be 
noticed that, for all the long-distance recruiting, opportunities in the vicinity 
in which the mill was located have a significant relationship with mill 
wages. Evaluated at the mean point the elasticity of female mill wages 
to female agricultural wages is .827. 
The analysis here does not directly tell us the character of the impact 
of the recruitment bonus on the decision to enter the spinning mill. The 
sign of the coefficient on Zz does suggest, however, that the recruitment 
bonus was taken out of future wage payments. A spinning mill recruit 
receiving the industry-wide average wage and the industry-wide recruit- 
ment bonus paid a total of three yen out of future wages for each yen 
she initially received. 
B. Shifts and Rest Periods 
A longer daily shift for a mill force was compensated in higher wages 
in the same way that longer rest periods during a shift of any given length 
meant lower wages. That the absolute signs of two coefficients are also 
statistically insignificant from one another, even if both statistically sig- 
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nificantly differ from zero, is reassuring. The size of the coefficient sug- 
gests that typically the marginal compensation for additional work by mill 
hands was less than average compensation. How the derived demand for 
labor and worker preferences between leisure and work might yield this 
result is left for future analysis and the statistical identification of the 
appropriate functions. 
C. Health and Safety 
In assessing health and safety conditions in the mills and their supply 
and demand, the analysis here is hampered as elsewhere by difficult prob- 
lems of multicollinearity. The coefficient on sickness and injury is insig- 
nificantly different from zero with the wrong sign. On the other hand, the 
coefficient on mortality is statistically significant from zero with the proper 
sign.21 The magnitude of the coefficient on mortality suggests that the 
typical female worker receiving the average industry wage would pay 
somewhat more than Y 2 over her period of employment in order to 
reduce the risk of mortality by .OOl. A thousand workers in the same 
situation would collectively pay Y 2000 in order to save one life. Given 
that the annual wages of such workers was Y 40-45, this could be 
construed as implying that these workers placed a monetary value on life 
which exceeded the economic potential or human capital embodied in such 
a life!22 
D. Dormitory Conditions and Free Time 
The remaining job characteristics in the wage explaining regression are 
all statistically significant from zero. Workers implicitly paid for their 
dormitory accommodations and food. Firms in 1897 implicitly compen- 
sated workers for the restrictions placed on their activities during their 
leisure. At the same time workers implicitly paid a tuition for the ex- 
istence and quality of schools within the dormitory compound. While 
restrictions on leisure demanded compensation, the worker apparently 
was not indifferent as to what she did. while confined within the mill 
compound. 
Inserting sample values for wages and firms with 100 female workers 
the estimated coefficient on dormitory living implies that an additional 
worker living in the dormitory would pay an implicit rent equivalent to 
8.5% of actual wages. Such a share for rent in total expenditures 
‘l The mortality data used in the analysis have been standardized for age. This standardiza- 
tion was accomplished with the Japanese life tables for the 1890s available in Yasukawa 
and Hirooka (1972). 
** For other estimates of the value of a human life relying on observed behavior with 
respect to safety see Smith (1976) and Thaler (1974). 
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is not out of line with the budget data which are available for almost 
the same year of the Meiji era (Yokoyama, 1949). 
The coefficient on the hours of free time for mill workers living in 
dormitories while significantly different from zero is exceedingly small. 
The price of an extra hour of free time outside the mill compound is 
less than 1% of a day’s wages for most mills. This somewhat surprising 
result may be rationalized in a number of ways. First, in this one instance 
the data may be suspect. Sample information on the number of daily 
hours allowed outside the mill compound was taken by B&en in- 
vestigators from firm regulations and not, as in the case of most of the 
information they collected, from actual firm practice. Alternatively, as- 
suming the data are correct, it does follow that the typical worker 
already allowed 2 hr did not value additional freedom very highly. That 
the mill for its part should take this attitude is still something of a 
puzzle. Elsewhere it has been shown that the runaway rate of mill re- 
cruits was so high for so long that mills almost certainly could have cut 
this rate had they been so inclined (Saxonhouse, 1976b). The mills chose 
not to do so because they viewed workers’ running away from the mill 
as an acceptable means of separation. Notice in Table 1 even the mills 
with relatively high rates of retention of newly recruited workers paid 
such cohorts of recmitees no special premium. The mills were not inter- 
ested in investing even the small resources necessary to build a work 
force composed primarily of long-term workers. The low implicit price 
for lessening mill workers’ opportunities to run away is certainly con- 
sistent with this view. 
The coefficient on food subsidies for workers in the wage explaining 
regression implies that typical workers implicitly returned approximately 
28% of this subsidy in the form of lower wages. This is yet another 
puzzling result. If the coefficient estimate is taken seriously, this result 
is prima facie evidence that arbitrage among job opportunities of varying 
characteristics was really not possible. It seems most reasonable that at 
the least there should have been a yen for yen substitution between 
wages and food subsidies. Or perhaps because the mill was buying in bulk 
conceivably the worker might have implicitly paid out more than it was 
costing the firm to provide the subsidized food. Given, however, that 
packages of job characteristics cannot be untied, the results here are 
plausible. Given that workers lived in a mill dormitory compound with 
restricted access to the outside, the firm had to provide dining halls and 
prepare food for its employees. The inability to cater to individual tastes 
and to problems inherent in the mass preparation of food may have caused 
workers to place a low value on what the firm was providing no matter 
how efficiently the firm might have been performing this function. 
It will be noticed that the coefficient on literacy in the wage explaining 
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regression is insignificantly different from zero. Notwithstanding that 
firms did not pay literate workers a premium, workers did implicitly pay 
firms for the quantity and quality of education offered. For example, if 
the mills would have doubled the number of instructors or halved the class 
size, workers would have implicitly paid 5.5% of the money wages they 
would otherwise have received in return for this opportunity. Finding 
evidence for such implicit payments is all the more surprising since, as 
was pointed out, these classes were attended after the conclusion of a 12-hr 
day or night shift.23 
E. Workers’ Traits 
While the Japanese cotton spinning mills of 1897 apparently paid no 
premium to workers for their literacy or for their initial disinclination 
to run away, the other traits in the wage explaining regression are sta- 
tistically significant from zero. The coefficient on the rate of absenteeism 
is, however, sufficiently small that it appears that the typical mill pro- 
vided little extra compensation for workers with good attendance. This is 
interesting since already in 1897 quite a few mills were reporting programs 
of bonii for workers with perfect attendance records. Since there is evi- 
dence that such programs did not have a time series impact it should not 
be too surprising to find that their cross-sectional impact was also quite 
limited.24 
If workers did not receive a substantial special premium for good 
attendance, age and increased experience appear to have brought signif- 
icant rewards. While multicollinearity hinders any effort at precisely dis- 
tinguishing the separate impact of increased age from increased experi- 
ence in this sample, separately they each significantly differ from zero 
with a 10% critical region. Taken jointly a small critical region will suffice 
to reject the null hypothesis. A 20-year-old with 1.5 years of experience 
in a firm of some 200 workers might have expected a 5% increase in wages 
should she have worked an additional year at her mi11.25 
23 In this instance as in others more interpretative weight than can be reasonably borne 
is being placed on significant regression coefficients. The majority of the Japanese mills 
in 1897 did not provide schools or instructional personnel. The presence or absence of 
compound schools may well just be a good proxy for overall mill quality. 
24 See footnote 5. 
z5 In Saxonhouse (1976b) using a comprehensive data set from the period 1891-1935 
relationships between productivity and experience and wages and experience were found in a 
general setting to be significant. The coexistence between these relationships and the high 
turnover and firm disinterest in cutting turnover can be understood if it is recognized that 
(i) technologically speaking most Japanese mills were almost identical; and (ii) most firms 
were reluctant to invest in improving the quality of their workers. In this paper it was argued 
that the improvement in worker skills was worker financed. 
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Vi. ESTIMATION OF PREFERENCES OF WORKERS 
WITH VARYING TRAITS 
Having briefly summarized what the estimation of Eq. (3) can tell about 
the implicit market prices for job characteristics and the institutions of 
mill paternalism an effort will now be made to look at the determinants 
of these market prices. Market price is determined by the interaction of 
supply and demand. It should be the intention here to estimate both these 
functions. Unfortunately as can be seen from Eqs. (1) and (2), while it is 
possible to identify the demand for job characteristics using nonjob firm 
characteristics which do not appear in Eq. (l), there are no variables in 
(1) available for use as exclusion restrictions in order to identify (2). 
Worker’s traits are assumed to affect both supply and demand functions. 
Thus, in what follows only demand functions for job characteristics will 
be estimated. 
With only one side of the market firmly identified a full explanation of 
the determinants of the price of job characteristics cannot be given. 
Nonetheless, estimation of the demand function alone will still provide an 
invaluable source of information regarding what workers in the early pe- 
riod of Japan’s industrialization valued. 
With ten job characteristics and five worker traits, the estimation of a 
system of demand functions which will serve the purposes of the analysis 
here is most complex. It is desirable to allow interaction among the 
demands for job characteristics. At the same time with so many variables, 
unless considerable structure is imposed on the problem, there is little 
hope of feasible estimation. Thus, on one hand it will be assumed that 
workers had transcendental logarithmic preference characteristics, a 
functional form which offers very rich possibilities for interaction be- 
tween various job characteristicP and from which a system of demand 
equations can be derived. On the other hand, it will be assumed that 
the preference function here is a tree with four branches.27 It is hy- 
pothesized that the worker, consciously or unconsciously, made decisions 
on how to allocate her income among four grand categories of off- and 
on-the-job expenditure.28 After the decision to allocate among four grand 
categories, a decision was made on within-category expenditure. The four 
categories include the following. 
(i) W = Off-the-job consumption:2Q WC = off-the-job consumption 
26 A description of transcendental logarithmic utility functions is given in Diewert (1974). 
*’ The utility tree approach is described in Strotz (1957, 1959). 
** Income is used here in Becker’s sense (1%5). In this context Becker defines income 
as the sum of potential pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation which might be received 
by the workers. 
28 These categories are arguably arbitrary, but given the functional form being used here 
some such choice is necessary. A priori it is clear that it makes no sense to estimate the 
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equal to money wages, and Wr = consumption out of bonii paid at time 
of recruitment. (ii) 2, = Pace of work: Z,, = length of rest periods, 
and Zlb = length of working shift. (iii) Zz Health care: ZPa = incidence 
of sickness and injury, and ZZb = incidence of mortality. (iv) Z, = Avail- 
ability and quality of dormitory experience: Z,, = percentage of workers 
living in dormitories, ZBb = numbers of hours of time outside mill com- 
pound per day, Z,, = food subsidy per dormitory worker x percentage of 
workers living in dormitories, and Z 3d = instructional personnel for 
company school per worker. 
Formally the system being described here can be expressed as follows: 
In U = In U(W,, Wr, Zla, Zlb, Zza, Z2b, ZSa, Z3b, Z3d; T) 
= ln UW(W,, WA Zl(Zl,, GA Z2Ga, GA (4) 
z,(z,a, Z3b &w z3dh TIP 
where, as before, T is the traits vector. Assume now that the worker is 
maximizing her instantaneous utility subject to the constraint that 
3 
W - C WiZi=O, (5) 
f=l 
for the grand budget allocation. 3o The first-order conditions for the 
maximization of utility can be written 
(13 In U)/(a In W) = p(W/U) 
(6) 
(a In U)/(a In ZJ = /L[( W*Zi)lU] (i = 1, 2, 3), 
where p is the marginal utility of income. From the budget constraint, 
CL/u= (,+ ;w*z)(~+~~I~ C7) 
i=l 
so that 
(alnuWlnW= (w+~w,)(~+~l~). (8) 
i=l 
The form of the relationship used to approximate the negative logarithm 
of the utility function is given by 
health care branch. In a two-attribute world Z,, and Zlb can only be substitutes. This is 
beyond the realm of plausibility. In any event, since it is not possible to get statistically 
signiticant estimates of WzW, it will be assumed that Z(Z,,, Z2,,) = ZZb. 
so The analytics of utility maximization and the derivation of the system of demand 
equations will be done for the tree and its four branches. The analytics of within-branch 
utility maximization, of course, are identical. 
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-In U = cx, + (Yw In W + $ CXzi In ZI + i &&zi In W In &, 
i=l i=l 
+ i i Pz,z, ln zi In zi, (9) 
f=l j=l 
+ i &T, In W In Tj + i 5 &,=, In Zi In Tj. 
i=l I=1 J=l 
Using this form with Eq. (8) the following can be obtained 
aw + Pwz, ln Zi + C PWT, In Tj 
W 
= W + C WiZi 
[a~ + c PWZ, + C Pw, In Tk 
+ c (a~, + PWZ, ln WPzfz, ln Zj + C Pz,Tj In Td 
az, + Pwz, In Wj + c Pz,z, In Zj + 2 PztTk In Tk (10) 
wizi = 
w + c WA Law + C PWZ, ln Zj + C PWT~ ln Tkl 
+ 1 (azj + &vz, In w  + c Pz~, In Zj + 1 /3z,Tk In Tk) 
(i = 1, 2, 3). 
Rearranging, one obtains 
W 
W + C WiZi 
= 
% + c PWZ, ln G + C h, In Tj 
[a~ + c PWZ, ln Zi + c PwTk In Tk + 2 (az, + pwz, In W 
+ 1 Pz,z, ln Zj + 2 PzITk In Tdl 
WA (11) 
W + C W*Zi 
a~, + PWZ, ln W + C Pz,~, ln Zj + C PzfTk In Tk 
= Law + c PWZ, ln Zj + C PWT~ In Tk + C (az, + pwz, In W 
+ C &z,,, ln Zj + C Pz,T~ ln Tk)l 
(i = 1, 2, 3). 
The budget-share equations in (11) constitute the first level of the system 
of demand which will be estimated. Because of the budget constraint, 
only three of the four equations in (11) are independent. In the 
empirical work to be reported it is assumed that the budget-share equa- 
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tions have additive disturbances with a joint normal distribution. Given 
the disturbances of any n - 1 of the budget-share equations, the dis- 
turbance of the remaining equation can be determined from the budget 
constraint .31 
The estimation of the within-branch share equations will proceed 
analogously with the first level of estimation. W( W,, W,), Z1(Z1,, Z,,), 
UZ!2a, -Gd, and Z3(Z3,, Z3~, Z3c, ZSd) will be separately approx- 
imated by a transcendental logarithmic form analogous to (7), and 
separate blocks of budget-share equations analogous to (11) will be 
derived. 
A. Estimation of Off the Job Consumption Branch32 
The results in Table 2 provide the demand part of the system which 
generates the market data on the relationship between recruitment bonii 
and wages reviewed earlier. Female workers viewed recruitment bonii 
and wages as substitutes. A higher recruitment bonus today was a sub- 
stitute for higher wages throughout the worker’s period of employment. 
Using the parameters of the demand subsystem a number of elasticities 
have also been calculated. The “expenditure elasticities” (really “receipt 
elasticities”) suggest that as workers receive more in wages and recruit- 
ment bonii, bonii became relatively less preferred. This is entirely con- 
sistent with the expected relation between resources and time preference. 
B. Estimation of the Pace of Work Branch 
The results in Table 3 make clear that the maintained hypothesis 
that mid-Meiji textile workers viewed rest periods during a shift and length 
of the shift itself as substitutes provides a plausible framework for 
estimation. Indeed, workers found the length of shift and rest periods 
during the shift to be very good substitutes. A 1% increase in the implicit 
price of either a change in the total length of rest period or a change in the 
length of a shift led to a better than 2% increase in implicit expenditure 
on the other job characteristic. Also, as a female worker had more re- 
sources to allocate to the improvement of the quality of her job, the 
estimated expenditure elasticities taken from the fitted utility function in- 
dicate that shortening the working shift was given priority over increased 
rest periods. This accords well with the historical experience of the cotton 
spinning companies after 1897 though it would be hard to argue that the 
3* The budget-share equations (11) are homogeneous of degree zero in the parameters; 
hence a normalization of the parameters is required for estimation. The following normaliza- 
tion is adopted: 1 a = - 1. 
32 To estimate the unknown parameters of the branch budget-share equations and the 
grand budget-share equations the iterative Zellner (1962, 1%3) estimation procedure is used. 
The interactive nonlinear estimation routine used in these procedures employs a combina- 
tion of Gauss-Newton and the method of steepest ascent. 
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Estimation of Off-the-Job Consumption Branch 
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Parameter Estimate 
R2 = .772 
Estimated expenditure elasticities 
VW,E 
?w,w 
Estimated Allen (1938) elasticity of substitution 
cw,wf 






















shortening which did occur was largely a result of changing market 
phenomena.33 
C. Availability and Quality of Off-the-Job Mill Compound Experience 
It is instructive to review the estimates for off-the-job but within-the- 
mill-compound attributes of jobs presented in Table 4 in light of the earlier 
discussion of typical implicit prices for these attributes. Despite the low 
implicit price for free time outside the mill compound, the expenditure 
elasticity of demand for unchaperoned hours outside the mill is very high. 
If increasing resources for improving her off-the-job environment became 
available unsupervised leisure time outside the mill was the preferred 
attribute. These findings together with the price inelastic demand for free 
time suggests, even if it does not necessitate, that a bountiful highly 
33 Secularly shifts were reduced from 11 hr of work to 8.5 hr of work in steps under the 
persistent pressure of the International Labor Organization. 
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elastic supply of free time from the firm side was responsible for the 
observed low implicit price of unsupervised time. As noted before, it 
seems that firms just did not care that much about security. That un- 
supervised free time and worker education should have relatively high 
elasticities of expenditure and that shelter and food should have low 
elasticities of expenditure is entirely consistent in spirit with most demand 
and budget studies.34 Stereotypes of the susceptibility of young Japanese 
female workers to paternalistic blandishments aside, the same inde- 
pendence which resulted in high runaway rates also resulted in a high 
preference for free time outside the mill compound over organized 
“leisure-time” activities provided by management. 
34 Of course, the categories used here are rougher or at least quite different from what is 
normally found in demand and budget studies. The expenditure elasticity of demand for 
food subsidies is not the same as expenditure elasticity for food. This does not, however, 
alter the conclusion drawn. 
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TABLE 4 
Estimates for Off-the-Job but within-the-Mill-Compound Attributes of Jobs 
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It is also most reasonable that dormitory services should be comple- 
mentary with free time outside the mill and with food subsidies. A 
substantial number of female workers bought no dormitory services and 
hence had little desire to purchase implicitly unsupervised leisure time 
and diminished, if not negligible, desire to gain company-subsidized 
food. 
While it is difficult to rationalize market prices, explicit, implicit, or 
otherwise, in the absence of information about the character of supply, 
the results on worker preferences for education do remain puzzling. Re- 
call that the implicit price of other available education within the mill 
was estimated as being very large. Now if the quality of available educa- 
tion is measurable by the teacher-pupil ratio it would seem that the 
supply of more and better quality primary and department education 
would be highly price elastic. Given that the expenditure elasticity of 
demand for education is near unity and that education’s own price 
elasticity of demand is evidently very high it is hard to understand why 
the implicit price of education was so high for many workers. 
VII. THE CHOICE AMONG OFF-THE-JOB GOODS, PACE OF WORK, 
HEALTH, AND DORMITORY LIFE 
The estimates of each of the branches or demand subsystems allows for 
the condensing of nine attributes into four: off-the-job goods, pace of 
work, health, and dormitory life. The estimation of the demand system 
given in (11) describing the allocation of female worker income on these 
four attributes conditioned on five workers’ traits is given in Table 5. 
The expenditure elasticities of demand calculated from the estimated 
demand system suggest that at very low Beckerian income3j workers cared 
most about wages. As incomes increased higher priority was placed on 
reducing the risk of mortality, improving on-the-job conditions, and, to a 
lesser extent, improving dormitory life. Evidence from this cross-section 
also does well as an indicator of secular trends. Real wages have 
risen since 1897 and while the prices paid are not known workers have 
implicitly purchased more safety and improved on-the-job conditions. And 
while improvement in the quality of dormitory life did occur before the 
Pacific War the great changes comparable to what happened in safety and 
shifts were only to come in the late 1950s. 
Too much should not be made of the poor worker’s strong preference 
for money wages. The results in Table 5 on elasticities of substitution 
and price elasticities of demand are such that even at a low level of 
Beckerian income workers will be most sensitive to new opportunities to 
reduce the risk of mortality, slow the pace of work, and improve dormi- 
tory life inexpensively. 
35 Low Beckerian income is defined in footnote 28. 
QUALITY WORKERS AND QUALITY IN JOBS 
TABLE 5 
Estimation of the Demand System Given in Eq. (11) 
63 


















































































64 GARY R. SAXONHOUSE 
TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
Estimated expenditure Estimated price elasticity 
elasticity of demand of demand 
7)wtw+zwp,, .84 7)z*w 3.455 
7)z>w+zw,z,, 1.38 1123 w 2.875 
rlz*tw+rwp,1 1.47 
%tw+rw(z,) 1.12 








CWZ* 3.302 l)WZ* .I856 
(JWZJ 2.851 %zz .I477 
~ZLZl 1.670 
uzz?z3 1.141 









VIII. TRAITS AND PREFERENCES 
In order to understand how preferences may vary among workers with 
different traits the sign of the partial derivative of each of the elasticities 
presented in Table 5 with respect to each of the five worker traits are 
presented in Table 6. 
The impact of traits on preference is understandably most complex. 
Workers with relatively low Beckerian income and a high propensity to 
run away exhibit a greater preference for money wages than their more 
stable counterparts. The same result carries over to workers exhibiting a 
high rate of absenteeism. The unstable poor worker cared relatively little 
for the mill environment. In contrast, older, more experienced workers 
even when poor showed relatively more interest in shortening the work- 
day and improving the dormitory environment. Interesting enough, this 
concern with the nonwage aspects of the job does not extend to lowering 
the risk of mortality. Older more experienced workers when poor seemed 
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TABLE 6 
Signs of the Partial Derivatives of Each of the Elasticities Presented in Table 5 
with Respect to Each of the Five Worker Traits 
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less inclined to pay for safety than other workers. Presumably the more 
experienced workers placed more reliance on themselves and less on the 
mill environment in the avoidance of risk. Similarly, older workers being 
closer to retirement or natural death might be viewed as having less to 
lose in human capital than their younger counterparts. 
The findings on the substitution and price elasticities are consistent 
with the above interpretation of the expenditure elasticities. Workers with 
high absentee rates and a high propensity to run away found nonpecuniary 
benefits relatively poorer substitutes for wages than other workers. For 
such workers the share of wages in the total Beckerian income will be 
relatively insensitive to changes in implicit prices. 
Again for older and more experienced and stable workers the opposite 
is generally true. For these workers most job characteristics are rela- 
tively good substitutes for each other and expenditure shares are rela- 
tively sensitive to price changes. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Changes in the quality, morale, and organization of the labor force in 
Japan’s early industrialization in textiles appear to be responsible for the 
bulk of the improvement during this period in total factor productivity 
(Saxonhouse 1977). Better education, more experienced labor force, and 
shorter working hours transformed an industry which could not compete 
with even Indian yarns in its home market into the major force in world 
textile markets. Most of these changes in the quality, morale, and organi- 
zation of the labor force were exogenously determined. The incidence 
of exposure to government-sponsored primary education changed dra- 
matically during the latter half of the Meiji period. Shifts were lessened 
in accordance with international pressure, and worker experience in- 
creased not because new recruits on the average stayed longer but rather 
because the industry matured and the one or two workers from each 
entering cohort who stayed permanently became the large corps of super- 
visory workers (Saxonhouse, 1976b). That the Japanese textile industry 
continued for 50 years to have a transient labor force does not mean that 
the industry’s elaborate paternalistic practices were a failure. In all likeli- 
hood the industry got the kind of labor force it wanted. Other nations 
have organized their labor forces differently and have had textile indus- 
tries using many more men and much more experienced labor. If this is so, 
what is the meaning of the industry’s paternalistic practices? The answer 
to this question will have two parts. First, what did paternalism mean to 
labor recruitment, and, second, how did practice of paternalism relate to 
the choice of technique by the industry. This study begins an attempt to 
answer the first of these two issues. The attempt is made within the broader 
setting of trying to understand the overall structure of worker prefer- 
ences and job choice. 
The econometric analysis performed here finds that workers in Japan’s 
early industrialization chose their jobs for both pecuniary and non- 
pecuniary considerations. In their transactions with their employers, 
workers exhibited a willingness to pay implicitly for dormitory space 
they might occupy, for food subsidies, for more time outside the mill 
compound, and for within-the-mill compound educational opportunities. 
The workers also exhibited a willingness to pay for on-the-job improve- 
ments such as more safety, longer rest periods, and shorter working shifts. 
Workers were clearly not indifferent to compound and job conditions. 
This does not mean, however, that a bundle of job characteristics 
weighted with nonpecuniary benefits was necessarily an efficient means 
of attracting workers. For example, the econometric analysis presented 
here suggests workers would have considered themselves better off if 
resources their employers devoted to food subsidies were given to them 
directly. Moreover, reactions to job and compound amenities varied from 
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worker to worker. The less the. Beckerian income the worker received 
from the mill the stronger the preference for pecuniary benefits. Also, 
the less a worker’s attachment to her job as manifested by high ab- 
senteeism and high propensity to run away the stronger her preference 
for pecuniary benefits. Such workers viewed nonpecuniary amenities as 
relatively poor substitutes for money. In contrast, older and more experi- 
enced workers, seemed to place a relatively higher priority on non- 
pecuniary benefits and were more sensitive to relative prices in deciding 
between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits. 
The association between the traits of stability and positive reaction to 
the mill and the job environment suggest further manipulation of these 
variables might have been one way to obtain the more stable work force 
which was absent from the textile industry in the pre-Pacific War period. 
Given the package of job characteristics offered during this period, the 
industry acquired a work force which cared primarily for the wages they 
were receiving and had little attachment to the job they were performing. 
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